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Chapter 11
Awareness as a First Step Toward Overcoming 
Implicit Bias
Cynthia Lee
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Conclusion
Chapter Highlights
• Awareness is a necessary first step toward reducing implicit bias.
• One way to raise awareness about racial bias in a criminal case is to
make race salient.
• Making race salient means calling attention to the possibility that
racial stereotypes or racial prejudice may have influenced the actions
of the parties in the case.
• Becoming aware of the existence of implicit bias and the fact that
everyone is influenced by implicit bias alone is not sufficient to
break the prejudice habit.
• One must also be motivated to break the prejudice habit and be
trained in ways to overcome bias.
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Introduction
For more than half a century, research on bias has focused on the idea that 
interpersonal contact with diverse others is the best way to reduce prejudice. 
Perhaps the most well-known proponent of the intergroup contact thesis was 
Gordon Allport, who argued in his book, The Nature of Prejudice, that inter-
group interactions involving individuals of equal status from different groups 
would lead to a reduction in prejudice.1 Since Allport’s book was first pub-
lished in 1954, much of the empirical research on bias reduction has focused 
on Allport’s intergroup contact hypothesis.2 This research has confirmed that 
intergroup contact reduces self-reported measures of prejudice.3 
Allport’s work relied on conscious action and self-reporting. Self-reporting, 
however, tells only half the story. One can honestly believe it is wrong to dis-
criminate against others and thus have low self-reported measures of preju-
dice, yet still have biased thoughts and engage in discriminatory behavior. A 
wealth of research over the past decade has shown that even when individu-
als do not consciously embrace prejudicial attitudes, they still manifest implicit 
bias, reflected in the tendency to associate members of different social groups— 
African-Americans, Latinos, Asian-Americans, gays, elderly people, and 
women—with stereotypes of these groups. This kind of stereotyping often takes 
place without conscious thought or awareness.
The existence of implicit bias has been demonstrated by several differ-
ent measures, including the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which compares 
response times when individuals are tasked with linking different sets of 
images and words.4 The IAT measures implicit bias by comparing the amount 
of time it takes to hit a specified computer key when one is shown images and 
words that one expects to go together, such as images of flowers and positive 
words like “pretty,” to response times when one observes images and words 
that one does not expect to go together, such as pictures of cockroaches and 
words like “lovely.”5 Time after time, individuals respond more quickly when 
they see images and words that are typically associated with one another and 
more slowly when they see images and words that are not commonly linked.6 
For example, most people are quicker to link Black faces with negative words 
and White faces with positive words, suggesting implicit racial bias in favor of 
Whites and against Blacks.7 Most people, including the elderly themselves, are 
quicker to associate good words with young people and bad words with elderly 
people, suggesting implicit ageism.8 Over 14 million IATs measuring bias 
based on age, gender, ethnicity, and other kinds of biases have been recorded.9 
Seventy-five percent of the individuals who have taken the race IAT have dem-
onstrated implicit bias in favor of Whites over Blacks.10
Once social scientists began to recognize that bias can operate without con-
scious awareness, they began trying to find ways to reduce not simply outward 
expressions of prejudice but also implicit bias. Reducing implicit bias, how-
ever, has proven to be a more difficult task than reducing explicit expressions 
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of prejudice. This is because all of us engage in what Patricia Devine calls the 
prejudice habit.11 Devine posits that in order to break the prejudice habit, there 
must be (1) awareness, (2) desire or motivation to break the prejudice habit,12 
and (3) training in ways that one can overcome bias.13 
I. Raising Awareness
This chapter focuses on just the first step in breaking the prejudice habit: mak-
ing people aware of implicit bias. While some social scientists have questioned 
whether making people aware of implicit bias can actually reduce bias,14 social 
psychologists and others who study racial bias generally agree that awareness of 
the existence of implicit bias is an important first step towards reducing bias.15 
A.  Implicit Bias Trainings and Efforts to Educate Jurors 
about Implicit Bias
One way to raise awareness about implicit bias is to simply inform individuals 
about its existence. Lectures and workshops on implicit bias have become more 
commonplace in various institutional settings, including in workplaces,16 law 
schools,17 law enforcement agencies,18 and other enterprises. For example, “[m]ore 
than half of Google’s nearly 56,000 employees have attended a 90-minute 
seminar on unconscious bias,” and 
nearly 2,000 of Google’s employees 
have attended “bias busting” work-
shops that “give Google employees 
practical tips on addressing uncon-
scious bias.”19 In response to accusa-
tions of racial bias by hosts renting 
their homes through Airbnb, Airbnb 
announced in September 2016 that 
it would offer implicit bias training to its hosts.20 In the government sector, 
on June 27, 2016, the Department of Justice announced that it would require 
its 23,000 law enforcement agents and 5,800 lawyers in U.S. Attorney’s offices 
across the nation to engage in implicit bias training aimed at getting them to 
recognize and address implicit bias in their workplace decisions.21 
Attention to implicit bias training is also present in courtroom settings, 
where some judges have started informing jurors about the existence of implicit 
bias and the need to try to guard against such bias. For example, the Honorable 
Mark Bennett,22 a federal district court judge in Iowa, routinely tells his jurors, 
Do not decide the case based on “implicit biases.” As we discussed 
in jury selection, everyone, including me, has feelings, assumptions, 
perceptions, fears, and stereotypes, that is, “implicit biases,” that we 
may not be aware of. These hidden thoughts can impact what we 
[I]n order to break the prejudice habit, 
there must be (1) awareness, (2) desire 
or motivation to break the prejudice 
habit, and (3) training in ways that one 
can overcome bias. 
—Patricia Devine
red58371_11_ch11_289-302.indd   291 4/25/17   4:02 PM
292  Enhancing JusticE: REducing bias
see and hear, how we remember what we see and hear, and how we 
make important decisions. Because you are making very important 
decisions in this case, I strongly encourage you to evaluate the evi-
dence carefully and to resist jumping to conclusions based on per-
sonal likes or dislikes, generalizations, gut feelings, prejudices, sym-
pathies, stereotypes, or biases. The law demands that you return a 
just verdict, based solely on the evidence, your individual evaluation 
of that evidence, your reason and common sense, and these instruc-
tions. Our system of justice is counting on you to render a fair deci-
sion based on the evidence, not on biases.23
Attorneys are also educating jurors about implicit bias.24 For example, in 
one criminal case out of Alaska, defense attorneys representing a Black teenager 
charged with assaulting a White25 classmate were worried that their all-White 
jury would assume their client was guilty because of racial stereotypes linking 
Blacks with violence and criminality.26 To combat this potential bias, the attor-
neys spoke about their own racial biases during voir dire to let potential jurors 
know that it is normal to have racial bias.27 They also successfully requested 
that the judge give the jurors a race-switching jury instruction based on a model 
jury instruction I first proposed in a law review article.28 Essentially, the race-
switching jury instruction told jurors they should think about the case with the 
same facts except imagine that the defendant was a White teenage boy and the 
victim was his Black classmate before deciding whether to find the defendant 
guilty or not guilty.29 The jury found the defendant not guilty. Switching as a 
means of raising awareness about bias can work in other contexts besides race.30 
Limited research has been done on the effectiveness of implicit bias train-
ings in general and efforts to educate jurors about implicit bias in particular. 
The available research, however, suggests that implicit bias training that simply 
informs or educates individuals about the existence of implicit bias is insuffi-
cient. To have any lasting impact, such trainings must give individuals strategies 
for reducing bias.31 Similarly, making jurors aware of the existence of implicit 
bias and the fact that it may affect their own decision making may not be 
sufficient to make a difference in outcomes.32 One study, for example, found 
that jury instructions informing jurors about the existence of implicit bias and 
instructing jurors to try to resist relying on generalizations and stereotypes had 
no significant effect on judgments of guilt, belief in the strength of the prosecu-
tion’s evidence, or length of sentence.33
B. Making Race (or Other Types of Bias) Salient
Another way to raise awareness about implicit racial bias in the context of a 
criminal case is to make the possibility of such bias salient. A wealth of recent 
research on race salience demonstrates that calling attention to the possibility 
of racial bias in others can encourage jurors to treat Black and White defen-
dants the same way. Samuel Sommers and Phoebe Ellsworth have conducted 
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numerous experiments studying the possibility that if racial prejudice is made 
salient to mock jurors in a criminal case, those jurors are more likely to treat 
similarly situated Black and White defendants the same way. 
In one experiment, for example, 196 White individuals were approached 
by a White experimenter in waiting areas of a major international airport and 
asked if they would read a written trial summary and complete a questionnaire 
about legal attitudes while they waited.34 The trial summary described a case 
involving a high school basketball player who had an altercation with a fel-
low teammate in the locker room, resulting in a charge of battery with seri-
ous bodily injury.35 Half the mock jurors were given a trial summary with a 
White defendant and a Black victim, while half were given the same trial sum-
mary with a Black defendant and a White victim. In both the race-salient and 
non-race-salient conditions, participants were given a description of the defen-
dant and victim, which included the height, weight, race, gender, and age of 
each.36 In some of the trial summaries, race was made salient through the tes-
timony of a defense witness who “testified that the defendant was one of the 
only two Whites (or Blacks) on the team, and had been the ‘subject of racial 
remarks and unfair criticism throughout the season from many of his Black (or 
White) teammates.’”37 In others, race was not made salient.38 In the non-race-
salient version of the case, there was no mention of the defendant’s race nor 
any mention of racial remarks.39 Instead, the defense witness testified that “the 
defendant had only one other friend on the team and had been the ‘subject of 
obscene remarks and unfair criticism from many of his teammates.’”40 Other 
than this testimony, the written trial summaries were the same.41 
Sommers and Ellsworth found that the White mock jurors were signifi-
cantly more likely to convict the Black defendant in the non-race-salient con-
dition (90 percent) than in the race-salient condition (70 percent).42 When 
race was made salient, conviction rates for the White defendant (69 percent) 
and the Black defendant (66 percent) were fairly comparable.43 When partici-
pants were asked to rate the strength of the prosecution’s case, they rated the 
prosecution’s case against the Black defendant as significantly stronger in the 
non-race-salient condition than the exact same prosecution case against the 
Black defendant in the race-salient condition.44 Participants were also asked to 
recommend a sentence for the defendant.45 In the non-race-salient condition, 
mock jurors recommended a more severe sentence for the Black defendant 
than the White defendant than in the race-salient condition.46 Sommers and 
Ellsworth concluded that when race was made salient, the participants did 
not demonstrate prejudice “because the racial content of the trial activated a 
motivation to appear non-prejudiced.”47 On the other hand, “when race was 
not a salient issue, a motivation to avoid prejudice was not expected among 
jurors, and White mock jurors did indeed demonstrate racial bias in their 
judgments.”48 
In another study, Sommers and Ellsworth had 211 individuals who 
were waiting to depart from gates at a large international airport read a trial 
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summary about a man charged with assault and battery against his girlfriend.49 
The man was at a bar with his coworkers celebrating a recent promotion when 
his girlfriend stood up and started making fun of his physique and sexual per-
formance.50 The defendant yelled at his girlfriend, forced her into a chair, and 
then slapped her.51 The slap knocked the girlfriend to the ground, injuring her 
ankle.52 In the race-salient version of the case, the girlfriend testifies that the 
defendant yelled, “You know better than to talk that way about a White (or 
Black) man in front of his friends.”53 In the non-race-salient version, she testi-
fies that the defendant yelled, “You know better than to talk that way about a 
man in front of his friends.”54 The only difference between the race-salient and 
non-race-salient versions of the case was the defendant’s mention of his race in 
this exchange.55
In this study, Sommers and Ellsworth found that when race was not made 
salient, both White and Black mock jurors demonstrated racial bias.56 White 
mock jurors gave the Black defendant a significantly higher guilt rating than the 
White defendant, while Black jurors gave the White defendant a significantly 
higher guilt rating than the Black defendant.57 Both White and Black mock 
jurors were also more punitive in their sentence recommendations toward the 
other-race defendant when race was not made salient.58 White mock jurors 
rated the Black defendant’s personality as significantly more aggressive and vio-
lent than the White defendant’s, and Black mock jurors rated the White defen-
dant’s personality as significantly more aggressive and violent than the Black 
defendant’s.59 When race was made salient, White mock jurors were more likely 
to treat the Black defendant the same as the White defendant.60 Black mock 
jurors, on the other hand, were still more lenient toward the Black defendant 
than the White defendant.61 Sommers and Ellsworth theorized that Black jurors 
may view the criminal justice system as inherently biased, and this belief might 
motivate them to demonstrate same-race leniency toward Black defendants to 
compensate for that bias.62
Sommers and Ellsworth’s research is widely cited, but it is important to 
note that Sommers himself recognizes significant limitations in the work: 
It remains the case, however, that too little is known regarding the 
psychological processes underlying the influence of a defendant’s 
race. This gap in the literature prevents conclusions from being 
drawn regarding, for instance, whether prejudicial attitudes account 
for the influence of defendant race on White jurors, or whether sim-
ple awareness of societal stereotypes regarding race and crime is suf-
ficient to impact judgments.63 
One concern that judges and others may have is that making race salient 
might lead jurors to overcompensate. In other words, if judges or attorneys 
make race salient, then jurors might let guilty Black defendants go free and 
convict innocent White defendants. The research on race salience, however, 
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suggests that making race salient 
simply reduces racial bias and results 
in White jurors treating similarly sit-
uated White and Black defendants 
the same; White mock jurors did 
not treat White defendants more 
harshly than similarly situated Black 
defendants.
C. Awareness Alone Is Not Sufficient to Break 
the Prejudice Habit
Raising awareness of the possibility of racial bias is a critical first step, but the 
existing research suggests educating people about implicit bias is not sufficient 
in and of itself to get them to break the prejudice habit. For example, for years 
it was thought that merely educating people about the value of cultural diver-
sity and making them aware of the existence of prejudice would help reduce 
prejudice.64 While there is some evidence that voluntary enrollment in a class 
that focuses on the value of diversity can lead to bias reduction,65 it appears that 
mandatory enrollment in a diversity training program is not effective at reduc-
ing bias.66 This might be because some people resent being forced to expend 
time and effort on something they might view as political correctness training. 
Similarly, it appears that simply telling people that they should try to avoid 
relying on stereotypes is not an effective way of permanently reducing bias.67 
While telling people to suppress their stereotype-congruent responses may work 
in the short term, such interventions may lead to greater reliance on the stereo-
type when the person stops consciously trying to suppress the stereotype. For 
example, in one study, participants were shown a photograph of a skinhead 
and asked to write for five minutes on a day in the life of the person in the 
photograph.68 Half of the participants were told to try not to rely on stereotypes 
about skinheads when writing their narrative.69 The other half were not given a 
stereotype-suppression instruction.70 As might be expected, the narratives by the 
individuals told not to rely on stereotypes were less stereotypical than the nar-
ratives by the individuals in the control group who were given no such instruc-
tion.71 Sometime after this initial exercise, participants were shown a color 
photograph of another skinhead and asked to write about a day in this skin-
head’s life.72 This time, the narratives by the participants who were initially told 
to suppress stereotypes were more stereotypic than those by the control group.73 
In a second experiment, which replicated the first part of the experiment 
described above, each participant was told after writing their narrative that they 
would meet the person in the photograph, and then the participant was taken 
to an adjacent room with eight empty chairs.74 A jacket and a backpack were 
on the first chair.75 The participant was told that the person in the photograph, 
The research on race salience . . . 
suggests that making race salient 
simply reduces racial bias and results 
in White jurors treating similarly 
situated White and Black defendants 
the same.
red58371_11_ch11_289-302.indd   295 4/25/17   4:02 PM
296  Enhancing JusticE: REducing bias
the skinhead, must have gone to the restroom and would be right back.76 The 
participant was told to choose any seat.77 Interestingly, participants who had 
been given the stereotype-suppression instruction chose seats further away from 
the seat with the jacket and backpack, whereas participants in the control group 
who did not receive a stereotype-suppression instruction chose seats closer to 
the seat where the skinhead presumably had left his belongings.78 The research-
ers who conducted the study hypothesized that there is a rebound effect when 
individuals are told to suppress stereotypic thoughts.79 In other words, when 
people attempt to suppress unwanted thoughts, these thoughts will reappear 
later with even greater insistence than if they had never been suppressed.80 
According to the authors of this study, this rebound effect happens “[a]s a 
consequence of the ironic monitoring process that occurs during suppression” 
because “unwanted constructs are continually stimulated or primed.”81
Other social science research also suggests that calling attention to race, 
either by asking people not to rely on race or asking them to rely on race, coun-
terintuitively increases the tendency to rely on stereotypes. For example, B. Keith 
Payne tested whether actively highlighting race prior to the decision to shoot 
reduced or increased stereotype-congruent errors in the decision to shoot.82 Par-
ticipants were told they would see pairs of pictures presented briefly—a face 
in the first picture and an object, either a gun or a hand tool, in the second 
picture—and they were to decide quickly whether the object in the second 
picture was a gun or a tool.83 Individuals in the control group were given no 
other instructions.84 Participants in the “Avoid Race” group were given the same 
instructions described above but were also told,
You have been randomly assigned to take the perspective of a com-
pletely unbiased person. Regardless of your personal views, we 
would like you to base your responses only on whether the second 
object looks more like a gun or tool. Try not to let the race of the 
face influence your decisions.85
Participants in the “Use Race” group were given the same instructions as the 
control group, but were also told,
You have been randomly assigned to the “racial profiling” condition. 
Regardless of your personal views, we would like you to play the role 
of someone engaged in racial profiling. That is, try to make correct 
classifications, but we would like you to use the race of the faces to 
help you identify the gun or tool in question.86
All participants misidentified tools as guns more often after seeing a Black 
face than after seeing a White face.87 They also misidentified guns as tools more 
often after seeing a White face than after seeing a Black face.88 Surprisingly, how-
ever, making race salient increased the tendency of individuals to stereotypically 
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misidentify objects regardless of whether participants were told to avoid relying 
on race or to use race.89 Participants in both the “Avoid Race” and the “Use 
Race” conditions were more likely to misidentify harmless objects as guns when 
held by Blacks and misidentify guns as harmless objects when held by Whites 
than participants not given any instruction calling attention to race.90 
What conclusions might we draw from these studies? A skeptic might con-
clude that making race salient helps reduce bias in some cases but exacerbates 
bias in other cases, so the best course of action is to do nothing. The research 
discussed above, however, suggests that salience reduces bias in complex set-
tings where individuals have to make intricate judgments—like jurors deciding 
whether to find a defendant guilty or not guilty—but such salience may have 
the opposite effect when individuals have to make a quick decision, such as 
whether to shoot a suspect who appears to be armed or where to sit before 
a skinhead who has gone to the restroom returns to the room. In the court-
room setting, where the fact finder has time to consider different arguments 
and weigh the credibility of witnesses, making race salient is likely to be more 
beneficial than harmful. Indeed, research on implicit bias and judicial decision 
making by Jeffrey Rachlinski, one of the authors of Chapter 5, which addresses 
implicit bias in judicial decision making, lends support to this theory.91 In Rach-
linski’s study, White judges who showed a strong preference for Whites were 
able to mediate their pro-White preference and treat Black defendants fairly 
when they suspected that their decisions were being evaluated for racial bias.92
Conclusion
As discussed above, there are various ways to raise awareness about implicit 
bias. In the workplace setting, employers can give employees the opportunity 
to attend implicit bias workshops and lectures. In the courtroom, judges can 
educate jurors about implicit bias. Attorneys can also make bias salient during 
voir dire, in opening and closing statements, and through witness testimony. 
Raising awareness about implicit bias is an important first step to reduc-
ing implicit bias, but it is only the first step. One must be motivated to break 
the prejudice habit and trained in ways to overcome implicit bias. The ensuing 
chapters will address various ways to motivate people to break the prejudice 
habit and overcome the implicit bias that affects us all.
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